

eral construction, environmental, land use, or other purposes that is required in the state of the former Soviet Union in which the project is being or is proposed to be carried out.

(h) Effective date

This section shall take effect six months after November 24, 2003.

(Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, §3125, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1748.)

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and not as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 which comprises this chapter.

§§ 5962, 5963. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–291, div. A, title XIII, § 1351(11), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3607

Section 5962, Pub. L. 108–136, div. A, title XIII, §1307, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1661, related to annual certifications on use of facilities being constructed for Cooperative Threat Reduction projects or activities.

Section 5963, Pub. L. 108–136, div. A, title XIII, §1308, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1662; Pub. L. 110–53, title XVIII, §1811(4), Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 493; Pub. L. 110–181, div. A, title XIII, §1305, Jan. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 413, related to authority to use Cooperative Threat Reduction funds outside the former Soviet Union.

§§ 5964, 5965. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–291, div. A, title XIII, § 1351(12)(B), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3607

Section 5964, Pub. L. 111–84, div. A, title XIII, §1304, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2558, related to metrics for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

Section 5965, Pub. L. 111–84, div. A, title XIII, §1305, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2559, related to Cooperative Threat Reduction Program authority for urgent threat reduction activities.

CHAPTER 69—CUBAN DEMOCRACY

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§ 6001. Findings

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights and for democratic values. It restricts the Cuban people’s exercise of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948. It has refused to admit into Cuba the representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission appointed to investigate human rights violations on the island.

(2) The Cuban people have demonstrated their yearning for freedom and their increas-

ing opposition to the Castro government by risking their lives in organizing independent, democratic activities on the island and by undertaking hazardous flights for freedom to the United States and other countries.

(3) The Castro government maintains a military-dominated economy that has decreased the well-being of the Cuban people in order to enable the government to engage in military interventions and subversive activities throughout the world and, especially, in the Western Hemisphere. These have included involvement in narcotics trafficking and support for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador.

(4) There is no sign that the Castro regime is prepared to make any significant concessions to democracy or to undertake any form of democratic opening. Efforts to suppress dissent through intimidation, imprisonment, and exile have accelerated since the political changes that have occurred in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

(5) Events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba’s external support and threaten Cuba’s food and oil supplies.

(6) The fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal recognition in Latin America and the Caribbean that Cuba provides a failed model of government and development, and the evident inability of Cuba’s economy to survive current trends, provide the United States and the international democratic community with an unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

(7) However, Castro’s intransigence increases the likelihood that there could be a collapse of the Cuban economy, social upheaval, or widespread suffering. The recently concluded Cuban Communist Party Congress has underscored Castro’s unwillingness to respond positively to increasing pressures for reform either from within the party or without.

(8) The United States cooperated with its European and other allies to assist the difficult transitions from Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is appropriate for those allies to cooperate with United States policy to promote a peaceful transition in Cuba.

(Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title XVII, §1702, Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2575.)

EFFECTIVE DATE

Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title XVII, §1712, Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2581, provided that: “This title [enacting this chapter, amending section 16 of Title 50, Appendix, War and National Defense, and enacting provisions set out as a note below] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 23, 1992].”

SHORT TITLE

Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title XVII, §1701, Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2575, provided that: “This title [enacting this chapter, amending section 16 of Title 50, Appendix, War and National Defense, and enacting provisions set out as a note above] may be cited as the ‘Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.’”

EX. ORD. NO. 12854. IMPLEMENTATION OF CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT

Ex. Ord. No. 12854, July 4, 1993, 58 F.R. 36587, provided: